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PATRICIA TICINETO CLOUGH 




When in 1992 I published my first book, I knew the name Gilles Deleuze as the co-author 
of the wondrous Anti-Oedipus published in 1972 and in English translation in 1983. My 
book The End(s) of Ethnography: From Realism to Social Criticism was surely influenced 
by what was then called poststructuralism; Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, all found their 
place in the book. Not Deleuze, however. Yet, it was also in 1992, after publishing End(s), 
that I was browsing in the journal section of a New York City book store and picked up 
the journal October. If I read the essay because it was by Deleuze, I don’t remember. But 
reading those five pages right there and then, in the book store, sitting on a small step 
ladder, would have a lasting effect on my thinking, teaching and writing.  It seemed to 
me, as it did to so many others, that the “Postscript on the Societies of Control” (cf. 
Deleuze 1992) diagrammed the near future. It would inspire me to read more of 
Deleuze’s writings, beginning with the cinema books, which were not then of much in-
terest to philosophers or, for that matter, many cultural and film studies scholars. But 
those books propelled me into the study of digital media – electronic media, as I would 
have put it then.  
 Like “Postscript,” the cinema books not only suggest that technologies are of great 
importance to understanding subjectivity, capitalist economy, and the state. But more 
they elaborate Deleuze’s singular approach to technologies – that each technology pro-
vides “a theory of conceptual practice,” as Hugh Tomlinson would put it in his transla-
tor’s introduction to Cinema II, such that philosophical invention for Deleuze is not a 
matter of theorizing cinema but rather a matter of engaging “the concepts which the cin-
ema itself gives rise to.” It is “philosophy as assemblage, a kind of provoked becoming of 
thought” (1989: xv). Deeply influenced by this approach, I have been engaged ever since 
with the concepts which digital media and computational technologies have given rise 
to, especially the way in which they urge a conceptualization of the social in terms of use 
or users.1 
                                                        
1 See my The User Unconscious: On Affect, Media, and Measure (2018) for my recent elaboration of the soci-
ality of the user. 
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2. 
When in 2013, I taught a graduate seminar on Foucault at the Graduate Center, CUNY, 
my introductory lecture for the course was titled “Au Revoir to Deleuze’s Foucault.” Per-
haps the lecture title was only a note to myself, a reminder that when earlier in 2006, I 
taught a graduate seminar on Foucault, I had ended the course with Deleuze’s Foucault, 
where Deleuze traced the movement in Foucault’s thought from focusing on the archive 
to focusing on the diagram (cf. Deleuze 1988). Arriving at my last lecture to discuss the 
book, I announced to the class with much enthusiasm that Deleuze’s Foucault touched 
exactly on all we had discussed that semester. The blank faces of the students suggested 
that they had not had the experience I had had reading Foucault. “Whatever could 
Deleuze be talking about?” students instead responded. If, in 2006, students found 
Deleuze’s Foucault a mystifying reading of Foucault’s works, the students of the 2013 
seminar simply felt no urgency to read it at all. Perhaps I felt the same: Au Revoir to 
Deleuze’s Foucault. 
 After all, by the 2013 seminar, Foucault’s late 1970s lectures on security, population, 
biopolitics, state racism, and neoliberalism had been published in English. The lectures 
offered an important adjustment to Deleuze’s treatment of Foucault in the “Postscript,” 
especially correcting the implication that there was a simple shift from discipline to con-
trol and not rather what Foucault would describe only as a “tendency” or “line of force,” 
“leading to the consolidation of apparatuses for organizing, assessing and investing pop-
ulations in terms of biopolitical capacities” (2007: 108). Nonetheless, for the students of 
my 2013 seminar, it was Deleuze’s “Postscript,” rather than his Foucault, that continued 
to have a major influence on their reading of Foucault, especially in their engagement 
with terrorism/counter-terrorism, surveillance, security, financial capital, debt, work, 
affect, digital media, and computational technologies.   
 These, as Foucault’s late 1970s lectures suggested, were to be taken up as technical 
matters, matters of population, calculation, and network, already pointing to what later 
would be elaborated as the datafication of education, incarceration, family, and commu-
nication – all also sketched in the “Postscript.” In contrast to discipline, Deleuze focused 
on power’s acting to modulate access to information as a matter of codes, passwords, 
and data, and where subjects no longer are individuals but “dividuals,” snippets of statis-
tical populations that are no longer masses but rather refer to “samples, data, markets, 
or ‘banks’” (1992: 5). Still, it might be better to think of the “Postscript” not as supplant-
ing Deleuze’s Foucault but rather as an extension of it. In that vein, Foucault is a prepara-
tion for the “Postscript,” especially in its focus on the diagram. Foucault surely points to 
the becoming of a diagram different than the one connected primarily with discipline, a 
diagram which is further elaborated in the “Postscript.” 
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 In Deleuze’s nearly metaphysical take, Foucault’s diagram is an “abstract machine,” 
“the map of relations between forces, a map of destiny, or intensity,” which “acts as a 
non-unifying immanent cause that is coextensive with the whole social field” (1988: 36-
37). As immanent cause, the diagram is realized and distinguished by its effects; it in-
forms not from above but from within the very tissue of the institutions, the forms and 
functions that it brings forth. The relation of forces, or power relations that constitute 
the diagram are “virtual, potential, unstable, vanishing and molecular” (37). While every 
society has its diagram, every diagram actually is “intersocial and constantly evolving” 
(35). As such, the diagram is distinguishable from structure; it is neither cultural super-
structure nor economic infrastructure. It is not historical, although it makes history pos-
sible. Rather, the diagram is churning up forms and functions, physical systems, practic-
es and proceedings, bringing new kinds of reality and models of truth into being. 
 For Foucault, as Deleuze points out, the diagram also is technical. That is to say, any 
existent but marginal technique or mechanism must be called by, or arise with a dia-
gram, in becoming central to that diagram, what Foucault refers to as “crossing the tech-
nical threshold,” becoming a (social) technology (Deleuze 1988: 40). Panopticism, for 
example, is a technology that operates “an entire micro-power concerned with the 
body,” a matter of  “infinitesimal surveillances” and “extremely meticulous orderings of 
space,” “indeterminate medical or psychological examinations” that inflect the gaze of 
the state through institutions of civil society, such as the clinic, the family, the school, the 
labor union, the military (Foucault 1978: 145-46). Panopticism is the social technology 
of disciplinary society, which overlaps with the historically specific liberal arrangement 
that separates the state, the economy, and civil society institutions, the private and the 
public spheres in the context of industrial capitalism. If in Foucault, Deleuze would turn 
our attention to the diagram, perhaps it was because the liberal arrangement was being 
displaced in the becoming ubiquitous of networks, especially global digitized networks. 
Digital media and computational technologies had crossed the technical threshold, be-
coming the social technology of control – what Foucault, in his late 1970s lectures, called 
“mechanisms of security,” characteristic of neoliberalism and financial capitalism.   
 
3.  
In his late 1970s lectures, Foucault treats neoliberalism in terms of rationalities that 
would make biopolitics intelligible as “this very specific, albeit very complex, power that 
has the population as its target, political economy as it major form of knowledge and 
apparatuses of security (or dispositifs) as its essential technical instrument” (2007: 108). 
Diagramming biopolitics, the lectures point especially to the way in which the ‘natural’ 
processes of economy became an internal limitation to sovereign power, more efficient 
than external juridical means, such as human rights. Yet, this is not merely a matter of 
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stripping the state of its functions, but more a full realization of what Randy Martin has 
described as “neoliberalism’s paradox” – where far from freeing “the economy to pursue 
its true expression, what was called deregulation, regulatory activities of government 
became hyperactive” (2011: 271). Or as Foucault put it: “So it is a matter of market 
economy without laissez-faire, that is to say an active policy without state control. Neo-
liberalism therefore should not be identified with laissez-faire.” (2008: 132)  
 This description of the state follows on Foucault’s earlier elaboration of the govern-
mentalization of the state, as the enclosures of civil society, the family, the school, the 
church, and the union were aimed at educating or disciplining the individual, socializing 
them in the ideology of the nation-state. But in neoliberalism, the mechanisms of securi-
ty, rather than educating or socializing the individual into the ideology of the nation-
state, would control through what Foucault would describe as “formal competition.” 
That is to say, while the market functions as a principle of intelligibility and a principle 
of decipherment of social relationships and behaviors, it does so not in terms of a meas-
ure of exchangeability but in terms of a formal structure of competition, the underside of 
the liberal promise of equality. As Foucault argues, this is a society where discipline is no 
longer central; “nor is it a society in which a mechanism of general normalization and 
the exclusion of those who cannot be normalized is needed” (2008: 259). Instead, there 
is “the image, idea or theme-program of a society in which there is an optimization of 
systems of difference in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in which 
minority individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought to bear on 
the rules of the game rather than on the players, and finally in which there is an envi-
ronmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of the individual.” 
(259-60) 
 Or to put this another way, the formal structure of competition works beside the 
natural process of the economy, imagined as lively or vital. Here, as Michael Dillon pro-
poses, life is to be understood as emergence out of contingency at the point where the 
aleatory or indefinite seriality lends itself to a statistical calculation of probabilities, as 
Foucault had put it (2007: 20). Life is thereby characterized by its drive to circulate in 
order to reproduce, to connect in its being open to combinatorial transactions beyond 
any unities, and to change without known ends, that is, to be complex. In this sense, life 
cannot be secured against contingency; “it is instead secured through contingency” (Dil-
lon 2008: 315). For Dillon, then, security is an assemblage of mechanisms for measuring 






Coils of the Serpent 6 (2020): 26-32 
 
30 Clough: Deleuze’s Foucault 
4. 
Focusing on mechanisms of security in relationship to exposure to contingency opens up 
Foucault’s description of the economy in neoliberalism to what has become both a pro-
duction and management of risk in finance capitalism, or the derivatizing of risk. As Mar-
tin has argued, derivatives seek contingency by securing the economy without insuring 
market equilibrium. In this sense, derivatives convert what was containable to what is 
dispersed (Martin 2013). They connect only the derived aspect of things and open these 
to a measured exposure to contingency. Even capital, Martin proposed, undergoes the 
derivative logic: “By abstracting capital from its own body, carving it up into more and 
less productive aspects that can be applied toward gain, aggregates of wealth making or 
terms of exchange (like currency exchange or interest rates), derivatives do to capital 
what capital itself has been doing to concrete forms of money and productive conditions 
like labor, raw material, physical plants” (2013: 89). This is all to say that the derivative 
logic of financial capitalism undoes what had been created in the aftermath of World 
War II as a configuration of national economies, which, by producing excluded groups of 
people along lines of race, gender, sexuality, class, and ability, at the same time promised 
integration of the wealthiest and the poorest in the commonality of the nation, in the 
promise of prosperity for a national population. But, with the financialized economy, 
these promises have been rescinded and the system-metaphysic of parts making up a 
whole also has come undone, changing the relationship of sociality to the measure of 
value in terms of the “nonprobabilistic, embodied sensibility of risk.” (2013: 97)  
 The neoliberal economy bases control on a probabilistic calculus, which Foucault 
described as unfolding in an environment that supports the circulation and mutual in-
teraction of causes and effects; the pricing of derivatives through trading intensifies this 
mutual interaction. However, this puts measuring, as Eli Ayache argues, “beyond proba-
bility,” as a process “supposed to record a value, as of today and day after day, for the 
derivative that was once written and sentenced to have no value until a future date” 
(2007: 42). The derivative “trades after probability is done with and (the context) satu-
rated” (41). When the context is saturated with all its possibilities, it opens up to what 
Ayache calls “capacity” that allows for the context to be changed (42). Pricing through 
trading “is a revision of the whole range of possibilities, not just of the probability distri-
bution overlying them.” For Ayache, this means “putting into play the parameter (or pa-
rameters) whose fixity was (supposed to be) the guarantee of fixity of the context and of 
the corresponding dynamic replication within a context” (44). With that fixity or context 
undone or put into play with each and every trade, measuring is no longer about calcu-
lating the future by means of pre-set probabilities. 
 This change in parameters, necessary to derivative trading, points to the working of 
algorithms that now produce and parse massive amounts of data, while reprogramming 
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their parameters, changing the rules of their operation in real time – what is called ma-
chine learning. The algorithms of datafication depend on contingency, on the indeter-
minism of the incomputable immanent to their working by which new algorithmic be-
havior or a growth of information beyond beginning instructions is made possible. The 
computational technologies of the algorithm constitute a form of measure that is itself 
productive of contingency in the growth of information, giving a further elaboration of  
what Deleuze described in the “Postscript” as modulation or a “self-deforming cast that 
will continuously change from one moment to the other or like a sieve whose mesh will 
transmute from point to point” (1992: 4). As the contingency, which is let loose in the 
neoliberal financial economy, becomes immanent to the computational technologies 
themselves, the diagram of security or control seems to be fully realized while opening 
to something beyond itself in the becoming of another diagram. 
 Perhaps, Benjamin Bratton offers a sketch of the diagram of computational technol-
ogies of security or control beyond control in what he calls “The Stack.” This is a design 
model for thinking about the technical arrangement of layers and layers of computing 
assemblaging human and other-than-human agencies or “users,” as Bratton refers to 
these assemblages. Not only does the Stack challenge the political geography of nation-
states, at a time when the state has never been “more entrenched and ubiquitous and 
never more obsolete and brittle” (Bratton 2015: 6). It does so through its many layers of 
computing that interiorize or take over some of the functions of the state and the work 
of governance, as various layers of computing bind polities to themselves, addressing 
every agency as users, making being a user what counts (2015: 10). As the use of data is 
socially mediated in that users’ data are accessed, identified, and measured by the very 
mechanisms that users already are using, the use of data necessarily makes users inex-
tricable from their data, and the data of many other users, including other-than-human 
users or agents. As Bratton sees it, the Stack does not put technology into sociality; ra-
ther, it has become “the armature of the social itself” (2015: xviii). As such, the user is 
the fully interiorized outside of the diagram of control. 
 And all of this barely touches on, although it leans heavily upon, the “three quarters 
of humanity too poor for debt, too numerous for confinement” (Deleuze 1992: 6) – even 
as there continue to be efforts to lure them into debt and force them into confinement. 
Deleuze hoped that “new weapons” (1992: 4) beyond hope or fear would be found, and 
perhaps he imagined that they would arise in those spaces outside debt and among 
those resistant to confinement. But wouldn’t there now be a need also to address those 
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5. 
Deleuze closes his study of the shift in Foucault’s work from the archive to the diagram 
with a consideration of the outside of the outside, maybe too affirmative a conclusion for 
Foucault; maybe not yet fully facing what would be the full realization of the diagram 
only pointed to in the “Postscript.” Nonetheless, what Deleuze proposes about the out-
side of the outside gives weight and extension to the profession of criticism that would 
respect that understanding of power which is Foucault’s legacy: “Forces come from the 
outside, from an outside that is farther away than any form of exteriority. So there are 
not only particular features taken up by the relations between forces, but particular fea-
tures of resistance that are apt to modify and overturn these relations and to change the 
unstable diagram.” (Deleuze 1988: 122) 
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